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This study investigates the eﬀects of controlling shareholders on corporate performance. The empirical
results, based on a unique database of Thai ﬁrms, do not support the hypothesis that controlling share-
holders expropriate corporate assets. In fact, the presence of controlling shareholders is associated with
higher performance, when measured by accounting measures such as the ROA and the sales-asset ratio.
Since most of the ﬁrms do not implement control mechanisms to separate voting and cash ﬂow rights,
the controlling shareholders might be self-constrained not to extract private beneﬁts. Otherwise, they
would internalize higher costs of expropriation from holding high stakes. The controlling shareholders’
involvement in the management, however, has a negative eﬀect on the performance. The negative eﬀect
is more pronounced when the controlling shareholder-and-manager’s ownership is at the 25-50 percent.
The evidence also reveals that family controlled ﬁrms display signiﬁcantly higher performance. Foreign
controlled ﬁrms as well as ﬁrms with more than one controlling shareholder also have higher ROA, relative
to ﬁrms with no controlling shareholder.
JEL Classiﬁcation: G30, G32
Keywords: Ownership structure, Corporate Control, Agency costs, Corporate Value, Thailand.
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Recent studies suggest that dispersedly held corporations described in the model of Berle and Means (1932) are
actually less common in countries outside the US and UK. Even in other developed countries, concentrated
ownership structure is more universal. Speciﬁcally about 64 percent of large ﬁrms in the 27 most richest
countries have controlling shareholders (La Porta et al., 1999). Except Japan, controlling shareholders are
dominated by families, who are often the ﬁrms’ founders or their descendants. For instance, in Germany,
families control 20.5 percent of the corporations (Franks and Mayer, 1997). In Italy and Sweden, a majority of
the public corporations are controlled by a single shareholder who holds majority voting rights (Zingales, 1994,
and Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2000).
In emerging economies, ownership concentration is more pronounced. Khanna and Palepu (1999) ﬁnd
that in India the majority of companies listed in the Bombay Stock Exchange are associated with diversiﬁed
business groups that are controlled by families. In Thailand, about 80 percent of non-ﬁnancial companies
traded on the Stock Exchange of Thailand are family-owned (Wiwattanakantang, 2000). Similar evidence is
shown in cross-country analyses on emerging markets by Claessens et al. (2000b), and Lins (2000). Claessens
et al. (2000b) reveal that except Japan, more than 40 percent of publicly traded ﬁrms in nine East Asian
countries, have a dominant owner who is a family. Similarly, Lins (2000) ﬁnds that 58 percent of the ﬁrms in
22 emerging economies have at least one blockholder.
The power to control a corporation might give a controlling shareholder use of corporate resources for his
own interests while other shareholders as well as other stakeholders of the ﬁrm bear the costs (Shleifer and
Vishny, 1997, La Porta et al., 1999. and Johnson et al., 2000). The transfer of company resources by controlling
shareholders comes in many forms, including consuming perks, setting excessive salaries, stealing investment
opportunities, and making ineﬃcient investment. This expropriation problem by controlling shareholders is
likely to be more severe in the ﬁrms where the controlling shareholders are also in management teams, when
controlling shareholders own more voting rights than cash ﬂow rights, and in the countries where the legal
protection and enforcement of laws are poor (La Porta et al. 1997, 1999 and Bebchuk et al., 1999).
In countries with poor legal rules protecting public investors, however, concentrated ownership might be an
appropriate choice to limit large shareholders’ expropriation (La Porta et al., 1999). Bebchuk (1999b) argues
that publicly traded companies in countries where private beneﬁts of control are large, or the degree of the
agency costs is high, are likely to have a controlling shareholder. Similar to the alignment eﬀect hypothesized
by Jensen and Meckling (1976), Gomes (2000) and Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) describe that by holding
a large ownership stake, the controlling shareholder internalizes private beneﬁts he extracts, and hence the
expropriation costs are reduced.
Since the presence of controlling shareholders are associated with both costs and beneﬁts to the ﬁrm, the
net eﬀect of controlling shareholders on corporate performance, therefore, is empirical issue. Studies addressing
this issue have been increasing rapidly in the past few years. However so far the analysis is incomplete and
1general conclusions cannot be drawn because most of the studies are based on only one group of countries,
i.e. the US, and other developed economies. Studies on emerging economies are still limited (e.g ., Claessens
et al., 2000a, and Lins, 2000). Most of them are comparable country studies, where diﬀerences in legal,
taxation and accounting rules as well as institutional frameworks are not controlled. As shown in La Porta
et al. (1997), and Bebchuk (1999a), quality of legal rules and enforcement aﬀect the level of expropriation
problems. This study, however, takes an alternative approach in the way that the analysis focuses on a given
country. In this context, the legal regime, and the country speciﬁc factors are held constant, which allows us
to investigate the eﬀects of ownership concentration more precisely.
Thai ﬁrms provide an ideal setting to study this argument. First there exist two type of ﬁrms: one is
characterized as high concentrated ownership, and the other is characterized by less concentrated ownership.
The latter is dominated by the former, however. Second, in about 75 percent of the ﬁrms, the controlling
shareholders are involved in the ﬁrms’ management as oﬃcers and directors. Also there are large number of
ﬁrms that are totally controlled by a single family. In these ﬁrms, no other large shareholder exists who might
perform monitoring activities. This type of ﬁrms accounts for about 34.81 percent of the ﬁrms in the sample
(Wiwattanakantang, 1999).
I conduct both univariate and multivariate analyses to investigate whether the presence of controlling
shareholder has negative eﬀects on the ﬁrm’s value. If the expropriation problem caused by controlling
shareholders is more severe compared to the beneﬁts, ﬁrms with controlling shareholders should display
poorer performance than ﬁrms with no controlling shareholder. The study is based on 270 companies which
accounts for 97.08 percent of the market value of all non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms that were listed in the Stock Exchange
of Thailand in 1996.
Interestingly, the empirical evidence indicates that controlling shareholders are not detrimental to the
corporate value. In contrast, the ownership concentration is positively associated with performance mea-
sures: ROA and the sales-asset ratio. The analysis also reveals that implementation of control mechanisms
to separate voting rights from cash ﬂow rights is not common. Only 17.4 percent of the ﬁrms in the sample
use pyramids and cross-shareholdings. The results, therefore, indicate that the controlling shareholders are
constrained by holding large stakes, thus cannot externalize most of the costs of self-dealing activities. Fur-
thermore, the evidence indicates that the incidence of controlling shareholders running the ﬁrms is associated
with lower corporate performance, compared to ﬁrms where the controlling shareholders do not hold top
executive positions. Speciﬁcally, the involvement in management by controlling shareholders is detrimental to
the ﬁrm’s value only when the controlling shareholders-cum-managers hold the shares of 25-50 percent level.
The empirical evidence also reveals that family controlled ﬁrms do not display lower performance. Overall,
family, foreign controlled ﬁrms as well as ﬁrms with more than one controlling shareholder have higher ROA,
relative to ﬁrms with no controlling shareholder.
This study diﬀers from recent studies on the eﬀects of controlling shareholders on the ﬁrm’s value in
2the quality of the data on ownership. This study is based on a a unique database of ownership structure
that provides more accurate measures of ownership variables. Most studies on this topic often use ownership
databases that include only major shareholders. The use of these databases causes biases when computing
ownership variables in at least 3 ways. First, in many cases a ﬁrm is owned by a number of small corporate
shareholders that have the same ultimate owner. In such a case, if information on those small shareholders
is not available, then ownership by the ﬁrm’s controlling shareholder is likely to be underestimated. Second,
in many emerging countries, large companies are often owned indirectly via a chain of companies that are
privately held. Their ultimate shareholders cannot be traced because of the lack of ownership information on
these privately owned corporate shareholders. Companies for which ultimate owners cannot be identify are
often excluded from the sample. This practice probably creates a sample selection bias. Third, family rela-
tionships between the major shareholders and the management were often not traced beyond their surnames.
The ownership database used in this study, however, does not suﬀer from these shortcomings.
This study also diﬀers from other studies in the deﬁnition of controlling shareholders or blockholders. Con-
trolling shareholders are deﬁned based on the Thai corporate law. Speciﬁcally, a shareholder is a controlling
shareholder if he owns at least 25 percent shareholdings. At this level of ownership, a shareholder has a legal
right to nullify any corporate decisions. Besides Cronqvist and Nilsson (2000), most studies employ ownership
cut-oﬀ points at 5, 10 and 20 percent, or use the Herﬁndhal index in measuring ownership concentration. The
reason for the choice of the cut-oﬀ points is not clear. It often looks like an at hoc choice. The choice of
cut-oﬀ points should be based on economic or legal frameworks of the given country.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical background of the
study. It reviews how ownership aﬀects the agency costs, and thus corporate performance. This literature
review provides the basis for a set of testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes data sources, characteristics of
ﬁrms in the sample, performance measures, control variables, and deﬁnitions of controlling a ﬁrm. Section 4
shows the ownership structure of ﬁrms in the sample, and contains univariate and multivariate analysis.
Finally a summary and conclusion are provided in Section 5.
2 Controlling shareholders and corporate value: Literature review
2.1 Costs and beneﬁts of controlling shareholders
Previous literature documents that there are both costs and beneﬁts associated with ownership concentration.
The presence of large shareholders with high stakes or controlling shareholders may be harmful to the ﬁrm
and the ﬁrm’s related parties because the controlling shareholders’ interests may not align with those of
non-controlling shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, La Porta et al., 1999, and Bebchuk et al., 1999). In
addition, substantial ownership of cash ﬂow rights not only enables the controlling shareholders to conduct
activities of their own interests, for example, to place and remove the management teams, but also insulates
3them from external corporate control mechanisms such as hostile takeovers and tender oﬀers (Stulz, 1988).
Controlling shareholders may pay out the companies’ cash ﬂows to themselves in several ways, including
simply paying themselves excessive salaries and dividends, and giving top executive positions and board seats
to their family members even though they are not capable. Controlling shareholders may pay (receive) inﬂate
(deﬂate) prices to the companies they own privately. Controlling shareholders may transfer companies shares
to their own account at discount prices or engage in insider trading. Other private beneﬁts that controlling
shareholders can obtain are employing companies’ assets as collateral for their personal bank borrowing, and
borrowing company funds for their personal purposes on favorable terms. Controlling shareholders may invest
sub-optimally since the costs of the investment if it fails will be shared by the other investors (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976, and Bebchuk et al., 1999). If controlling shareholders adopt sub-optimal strategies, we expect
to observe the ﬁrms under their control to perform poorly.
The presence of controlling shareholders, however, may not necessarily be detrimental to the ﬁrm. Shleifer
and Vishny (1986) and Admati et al. (1994)) contend that large shareholders mitigate the free rider problem
of monitoring a management team, and hence reducing the agency costs. Shareholders with large stakes have
incentive to bear monitoring costs because gains from investing in monitoring activities exceed the costs.
More recent works model the beneﬁts of large shareholders in a diﬀerent context. La Porta et al. (1999),
Bebchuk (1999b), and Gomes (2000) argue that in the countries when the legal and institutional frameworks
do not oﬀer suﬃcient protection for outside investors, concentrated ownership can mitigate the shareholder
conﬂicts. Gomes (2000) contends that in this kind of environment the only equilibrium is to have controlling
shareholders. The basic intuition is that large ownership stakes provide a commitment signal to outside in-
vestors that the controlling shareholders would not divert corporate assets. The signal is credible to outside
investors because outside investors evaluate the share prices based on their expectations of ex-post expropri-
ation by the controlling shareholders. If the controlling shareholders extract the cash ﬂow, outside investors
will discount the share prices. Consequently, the controlling shareholders will end up holding large proportion
of the shares with a discounted price.
These arguments on the presence of controlling shareholders and the consequent corporate value implica-
tion lead to the following hypothesis:
H1: The presence of controlling shareholders has no eﬀect on corporate performance.
2.2 Control mechanisms and agency costs
Burkart et al. (1998) and Bebchuk et al. (1999) argue that patterns of corporate ownership are critical to the
level of private beneﬁts extracted by the controlling shareholders. Ownership and control patterns such as
pyramids, cross-ownership ties and dual-class share structures permit controlling shareholders to reduce the
cash ﬂow rights associated with voting rights. In such cases, the controlling shareholders can exercise control
while holding small cash ﬂow rights. Here we focus on pyramidal ownership and cross-shareholdings since
4Thai ﬁrms are not allowed to issue dual class voting or non-voting shares.
Pyramidal ownership is the process of controlling via layers of companies. Cross-shareholdings is a mech-
anism for not only assuming eﬀective control, disproportionate to ownership, but also to protect the power of
the controlling shareholders (Bebchuk et al., 1999). These ownership structures exacerbate the expropriation
problems because the controlling shareholders while consuming all the private beneﬁts, only internalize part
of the expropriation costs, as a proportion to their cash ﬂow rights. In addition, these control mechanisms can
be used to assure control, and insulate the controlling shareholders from being monitored by any corporate
governance mechanisms.
This argument leads to the following hypothesis:
H2: The separation between voting and cash ﬂow rights via the employment of pyramid and cross-ownership
structure has negative eﬀect on the corporate performance,
2.3 Types of controlling shareholders and agency costs
There are at least four diﬀerent types of controlling shareholders in Thai ﬁrms, namely individual or family,
foreign investors, the Thai government, and a group of more than one controlling shareholder (Wiwattana-
kantang, 1999 and 2000)). The eﬀects of the presence of controlling shareholders on performance, however,
may diﬀer according to the types of controlling shareholders.
There are two opposite arguments associated with an individual or a group of family as a controlling
shareholder. On one hand, family is notorious for putting the interests of the family above the interests
of other stakeholders of the ﬁrm. Due to immense voting power and frequent involvement in management,
families can implement policies that beneﬁt themselves and are detrimental to the ﬁrms’ performance (La
Porta et al., 1999)).
On the other hand, family members provide good monitoring in family-controlled ﬁrms, resulting in lower
agency costs (Fama and Jensen, 1983, and DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1985). Family members have incentives to
increase the ﬁrm’s value and be good monitors because their wealth, which includes pecuniary returns as well
as non-pecuniary returns, such as beneﬁts from having control over the companies, is linked to the continuation
of the companies. The implicit contract among family members, like the responsibility toward the family, may
discourage owner-managers from abusing their power and transferring corporate funds to themselves. The
family last name is also commonly used in the company name suggesting the close tie between the family and
the ﬁrm. Further, monitoring and disciplining the management, often family members, by family members
may be eﬃcient not only because of the close interaction of family members, but also family members have
excellent information on the ﬁrm, as a result of a long term relationship with the top management of the ﬁrm
(Smith and Amoako-Adu, 1999).
There are various factors that may lead to performance diﬀerences between foreign and domestic ﬁrms.
First, foreign-controlled ﬁrms possess ﬁrm-speciﬁc advantages and superior technology know-how (Boardman
5et al., 1997, and Majumdar, 1997). Second, as far as Thailand is concerned, foreign ﬁrms obtain various
investment promotion beneﬁts from the Thai government. Third, their controlling are not located in Thailand
making monitoring more diﬃcult. Finally, most of the ﬁrms that have foreign corporations as their controlling
shareholders are run by professionals who own no stakes in the ﬁrms. Due to the ﬁrst and second factors,
foreign-controlled ﬁrms are likely to display superior performance relative to domestic ﬁrms. The latter
factors, however, are likely to aﬀect the ﬁrms’ governance and corporate performance negatively.
Government-controlled ﬁrms are considered separate entities because government-controlled ﬁrms are op-
erating in a monopoly or regulated duopoly markets, that may give rise to superior performance.
Agency problems and contractual costs of a ﬁrm that is controlled by more than one family might not be
the same as those with one controlling shareholder. If there exists more than one large shareholder in a ﬁrm,
the large shareholders may monitor each other, hence reducing the agency costs.
The hypotheses drawn from these arguments are:
H3.1: Family has no eﬀect on corporate performance,
H3.2: Foreign investor has no eﬀect on corporate performance,
H3.3: Government has positive eﬀect on corporate performance,
H3.4: Firms that have more than one controlling shareholder display superior performance.
2.4 Controlling shareholders’ involvement in management and agency costs
Recent studies document that controlling shareholders are often involved in running the ﬁrms. In this case,
controlling shareholders have signiﬁcant power and discretion in the employment of corporate assets for
their own interests, without being pressured from outside corporate control (Stulz, 1988). According to this
entrenchment hypothesis, the level of expropriation of private beneﬁts is negatively related to the ownership
of management.
On the other hand, the traditional aspect of the agency cost theory suggests that insider ownership aligns
the interests of management and other stakeholders of the ﬁrm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Managers are
more likely to become self-constrained and avoid consumption of perquisites as their ownership rises since they
have to bear the costs of such activities in a proportion to their shareholdings. DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985)
argue that by holding high stakes of the ﬁrm, insiders may solve the asymmetric information problems related
to investment opportunities and managerial performance between the insiders and outside shareholders. For
example, outside shareholders may have preference for investment projects that provide faster payoﬀs although
their net present values are lower than the investment projects that the controlling shareholders want to carry
out. Summing up, the alignment of incentives hypothesis contends a positive and linear relation between top
management ownership and the agency costs.
6Empirical studies support both hypotheses, however. The empirical evidence on the non-linear relationship
between ownership by top management and performance can be explained by combining the convergence of
incentives and the entrenchment hypotheses (M´ orck et al., 1988, and Short and Keasey, 1999). That is, at
low levels of ownership, management has the incentive to pursue the ﬁrm’s value maximization activities. At
intermediate levels of ownership, management has enough control and is wealthy enough to exploit the ﬁrm to
generate private beneﬁts that are not available to outside shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). However,
at high levels of ownership, self-serving behavior detrimental to the ﬁrm’s value declines as management owns
a higher fraction of the ﬁrm’s equity, and hence can not externalize the costs of their moral hazard.
From these arguments, I formulate the following hypothesis:
H4: The involvement in management by controlling shareholders is non-linearly related to their ownership.
At lower level of ownership, the involvement in management by controlling shareholders has negative
eﬀect on performance. At higher level of ownership, the involvement in management by controlling
shareholders has positive aﬀect on on performance.
3 Data and measurement techniques
3.1 Data sources
This study uses ﬁrm-level data for non-ﬁnancial companies listed in the Stock Exchange of Thailand in 1996.
The data were collected from multiple sources. The equity ownership, members of the board of directors,
number of shares outstanding, accounting data (for consolidated companies) and years of incorporation are
obtained directly from the Stock Exchange of Thailand and from the I-SIMS database produced by the Stock
Exchange of Thailand.
This study is based on a unique database on the ownership. First, the data which was obtained directly
from the Stock Exchange of Thailand contains ownership information in great detail. This database provides
the information on shareholders with shareholdings of at least 0.5 percent. Second, for each ﬁrm, I was able to
obtain family relationships between the major shareholders and the management beyond their surnames. The
Stock Exchange of Thailand requires listed companies to disclose the information. The library of the Stock
Exchange of Thailand keeps this information and allows public access. Additional references for ownership
structure and family relationships, especially those aﬃliated with big business groups are obtained from
the Thai newspaper, Krung Thep Turakij (various issues), Prachachat Turakij (various issues), Manager
Information Services (1996) Pornkulwat (1996), Suehiro (1989), and Pipatseritham (1981).
Finally, I was able to obtain the information on ownership structure of non-listed companies that are
shareholders of companies in the sample. This data was collected manually from the Ministry of Commerce.
With this information, I was able to trace ultimate owners of ﬁrms. As a result, I managed to include a large
number of companies in the sample. The sample includes 270 companies which accounts for 97.08 percent of
7the market value of all non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms that were listed in the Stock Exchange of Thailand in 1996.
Except data on ownership, the data used are as of the end of 1996. For ownership data, the database
provides the ownership information at diﬀerent time for diﬀerent companies over the period from January 1
through December 31, 1996.
3.2 Sample description
The characteristics of the companies in the sample are presented in Table 1. Panel A shows the number
of companies in the sample classiﬁed by industry. The industry groupings follow the classiﬁcation of the
Stock Exchange of Thailand. Panel B presents descriptive statistics for companies in the sample. In general,
companies in the sample are not just small or start-up companies. The average number of years since a ﬁrm
was set up is 21.02 years. The sample includes both large companies and smaller size companies. The book
values of total assets vary from 179,785 million Baht to the minimum of 325.82 million Baht, with mean and
median values of 7,140.71 million Baht and 2,428.76 million Baht, respectively. Sales revenues and the market
value of equity present a similar picture.
The ranking of companies in Thailand, published by Management Information Service (1996b) shows that
this sample also includes large companies in Thailand.1 Speciﬁcally, 22 companies in our sample appear in
the 100 largest companies in Thailand in 1994. About 35.56 percent of companies in the sample are among
the largest 500 companies in Thailand. Approximately 77.78 percent of our sample or 210 companies are in
the top 2000 companies.
[Insert Table 1 Here]
3.3 Measurement of corporate performance
This study uses both accounting and market measures of performance. Since the extraction of corporate
resources by controlling shareholders, e.g., perk consumption, empire building, asset sales, stealing of in-
vestment opportunities, excessive management compensation, and ineﬃcient investment, reﬂects in both the
balance sheets and the income statements, performance measures that incorporate the expropriation in both
the balance sheet and the income statement should be more meaningful. In this paper, I use two alternative
accounting measures ROA and the sales-asset ratio. To avoid the eﬀect of ﬁrms’ discretion choices of capital
structure, ROA is deﬁned as the ratio of earnings before interests and taxes to total assets.
I employ the sales-asset ratio to compensate the weaknesses of the ROA. The ROA is widely thought that it
might not be absolutely accurate in measuring a ﬁrm’s performance in the case of ﬁrms in developing countries
including Thai ﬁrms where the accounting standard is not well established for several reasons. First, earnings
1Management Information Service (1996b) lists the 2000 largest companies in Thailand in 1994. The ranking includes both
publicly traded and private companies. This source of information is used because there is no information available for 1996.
It is the closest data available to 1996. The rankings based on 1994 data probably do not provide exact information for the
companies in our sample. Nevertheless, the rankings do help to understand the characteristics of companies in our sample.
8are easily manipulated by the management. Second, there is a bias associated with accounting standards,
regarding advertising expenses and depreciation costs. Lastly, discretionary reporting choices also aﬀect
the level of earnings. Compared to the earnings, sales are less aﬀected by ﬁrm-level earnings management.
The sales-asset ratio measures the eﬀectiveness of management in utilizing the ﬁrm’s assets to generate sale
revenues. However, as well documented in the case of Japan, the maximization of sales may not necessarily
lead to the maximization of proﬁt.
Since not all agency costs are reﬂected in the accounting measures, I also compute a market measure,
Tobin’s q. Due to data unavailability, I use the simpliﬁed version of Tobin’s q, deﬁned as the market value of
equity at the end of the accounting year plus the book value of liabilities divided by the book value of total
assets.
There is one caveat here on measures of performance. Measures of performance that are commonly used
in studies on more developed economies are not absolutely appropriate as far as developing economies are
concerned. On one hand, accounting measures are not accurate because they are subject to manipulation
by management. On the other hand, the market measure, Tobin’s q, cannot be used without creating any
measurement bias. For Tobin’s q to provide an accurate measure of performance, stock prices have to reﬂect
the true value of the ﬁrm (Lindenberg and Ross, 1981). As Khanna and Palepu (1999) point out, this implicit
assumption may not be met in the case of emerging economies because the capital markets are illiquid and
there is a lack of timely disclosure. So it is not clear whether the market measure or the accounting measures
is more accurate in the case of Thai ﬁrms.
3.4 Control variables: Firm characteristics and industry eﬀects
A ﬁrm’s value may be aﬀected directly or indirectly by factors related to the nature of the ﬁrm and its industry.
To control for such eﬀects, I introduce the following variables: sales growth (the percentage of annual change
in sales, averaged over 1992-1996), log (age) which is the log of the number of years since ﬁrms were set up,
the log of total assets which is the measure of ﬁrm’s size, the debt-asset ratio (total debt divided by the book
value of total assets), and business group. Deﬁnitions of all variables used in this study can be referred from
Table 2.
The business group is a dummy variable. It is one if the ﬁrm is controlled by any of the following 23 fami-
lies: Asakun, Chirathiwat, Choke Wattana, Chonwicharn, the Crown Property Bureau, Darakanon, Kanasut,
Laohathai, Lamsam, Liaophairat, Osathanukhro, Phenchart, Pornprapha, Photirattanangkun, Rattanarak,
Sophonpanit, Srifuengfung, Sriwikorn, Uachukiat, Wang Lee, Wiriyaprapaikit, Wattanawekin, and Wongku-
solkit. These business groups were among the hundred largest business groups in 1979 (Pipatseritham, 19812),
and the groups survive to the present time.
In order to remove variation from industry eﬀects on the dependent variable, I include 21 industry dummy
2As far as I know, this is the most recent source of information that can be used as a reference.
9variables with agribusiness as the reference industry. The speciﬁcation of the industries follows that of the
Stock Exchange of Thailand (see Section 3).
[Insert Table 2 Here]
3.5 Deﬁnition of controlling shareholders
A controlling shareholder is deﬁned as an entity who owns more than 25 percent of ﬁrm’s shares directly, or
indirectly. The 25 percent level is used following the deﬁnition of the Stock Exchange of Thailand for control-
ling shareholders. Under the Public Limited Companies Act, at this level of shareholdings, a shareholder has
suﬃcient voting power to have signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the ﬁrm in the following manners. First, a controlling
shareholder can nullify any corporate decisions. Second, a controlling shareholder can demand to inspect the
business operation and the ﬁnancial condition of the company, as well as the conduct of the board. Third, a
controlling shareholder can call an extraordinary general meetings at any time. Fourth, a controlling share-
holder can submit a motion to the court demanding for the dissolution of a company if he thinks that further
company operations will bring only losses, and that the company has no chance of recovery. (Stock Exchange
of Thailand, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c, 1998, Setsatien, 1992, and Sersansie and Nimmansomboon, 1996).
Note that with 25 percent of the shares, a controlling shareholder does not have absolute control over a
ﬁrm. For a resolution of a shareholder meeting, the law requires a majority rule. A super-majority of at
least 75 percent of the voting rights, however, is required in the following cases: increases and decreases of
the equity capital, issuing corporate bonds, changing in the acts of incorporation, merger and acquisition,
and dissolution of the company, as well as making, amending or terminating a contract relating to selling,
transferring leasing of the company’s assets (Sersansie and Nimmansomboon, 1996).
Ownership here is deﬁned based on voting rights not cash ﬂow rights. Direct ownership means that an
individual (or a family) holds shares in his own name. Members of a family are treated as a single shareholder
since they probably vote as a coalition. Members of a family means those who have the same family name and
relatives of in-laws of the family. Although there have been cases of sibling rivalry for obtaining controlling
power within a family, here I do not take this topic into consideration.
In the case when a ﬁrm’s shares are held by a company or through a chain of companies, I search for the
ultimate owner (controlling shareholder) of the last company. This indirect ownership is deﬁned in the same
way as La Porta et al. (1999). An individual or a family B indirectly controls x percent of company 1 if: i).
B directly holds more than 25 percent of shares of company 2, which directly holds x percent of company 1;
or ii). B directly controls company 3 which in turn controls company 2, which directly holds x percent of
company 1. The chain of controlling of a ﬁrm could consist of many layers. Here we do not place a limit to
the number of companies in this control chain as long as each of the companies has controlling power over
the next one.
In the cases where the controlling shareholder controls a ﬁrm via more than one type of shareholding, the
10ultimate ownership is the summation of all the voting rights of the shareholdings via various patterns. For
example, if a family B owns directly x percent of shares of company 1, and owns at least 25 percent of the
shares of company 2 which in turn owns y percent of shares of company 1, the total voting rights of company
1 owned by B is then x + y percent.
For foreign corporate shareholders, I do not search for to the ultimate control of their parent companies.
So it can be the case that ﬁrms that have foreign corporations as their controlling shareholders, and hence
deﬁned as foreign-controlled ﬁrms, may be actually widely-held ﬁrms if their parent companies in the home
based countries are dispersedly owned.
Firms that do not have an ultimate controlling shareholder, a shareholder of more than 25 percent voting
rights, are deﬁned as ﬁrms without a controlling shareholder. Firms that are owned by a corporation as well
as a ﬁnancial institution that has no controlling shareholder also fall into this category.
Regarding control mechanisms, I deﬁne a pattern of pyramid and cross-shareholding shareholdings in the
same manner as La Porta, et al. (1999). Company Z is controlled through a pyramid if it is controlled by
a public company Y, which is in turn controlled by a family X. Companies in the middle are required to be
public companies. If company Y is privately owned by family X, we do not call this ownership structure a
pyramid. If ﬁrms in the middle of the chain of control are privately owned by a family, the family then is not
able to separate cash ﬂow and control rights.
For cross-shareholding structures, company Z has cross-shareholdings if it also holds any shares of its
corporate controlling shareholders, or other companies along the chain of control.
The following examples of ownership structure provide better understanding on how Thai ﬁrms are owned.
Figure. 1 shows the ownership of Italian-Thai Development, one of the largest property and development
companies in Thailand. The Kanasut family, one of the founders, directly owns 34.13 percent of Italian-Thai
Development. The Kanasut family, however, indirectly controls more votes of Italian-Thai Development.
The family controls 25.67 percent of Ital-Thai Holdings, which in turn controls 12 percent of Italian-Thai
Development. Italian-Thai Holdings also controls 95.16 percent of Ital-Thai Industrial, another shareholder
of Italian-Thai Development with 8.54 percent ownership. The Kanasut family is not the only one controlling
shareholder of Italian-Thai Development. The Jaranachit family, also has controlling votes in the ﬁrm. The
Jaranachit family holds 21.73 percent of Italian-Thai Development directly, and indirectly through controlling
29.71 percent of Ital-Thai Holdings’ shares. However the Kanasut family and the Jaranachit family are actually
considered as one family because they are related by marriage. One of the daughters of the Kanasut family
is married to the Jaranachit family. In this case, the Kanasut family and the Jaranachit family together own
80.81 percent of voting rights of Italian-Thai Development. Because both Ital-Thai Holdings and Ital-Thai
Industrial are not publicly traded, the ownership structure of Italian-Thai Development is not a pyramid.
Metro System Corporation is an example of a company that has one controlling shareholder but ultimately
is controlled by a group of more than one controlling shareholder (Figure. 2). The major shareholders of Metro
11System Corporation are Sri Krung Wattana (32.85 percent) and Sahapattanapoon (12.26 percent). Both Sri
Krung Wattana and Sahapattanapoon are holding companies of the Sri Krung Wattana group, which is one
of the Thai big business groups. This group is controlled by three families, namely the Laohathai family,
the Setpornpong Family, and the Tangtrongsak Family. Due to data unavailability, it is not possible to
specify fractions of shares of Metro System Corporation owned by the three families, I classify Metro System
Corporation as having more than one ultimate controlling shareholder.
An example of a ﬁrm that is controlled by two separate groups of shareholders is the Malee Sampran
Factory (Figure. 3). The pattern of shareholdings of Malee Sampran Factory gives also an example of control
through pyramid companies. There are two diﬀerent groups of ultimate shareholders with controlling votes:
the Kulapiyawaja family who is also the founder of Malee Sampran Factory, and the Chirathiwat family. Both
families control Malee Sampran Factory indirectly via holding companies that appear in the ﬁrst layer of the
ownership structure of Malee Sampran Factory. That is, the Kulapiyawaja family controls 100 percent of the
Bunmalee Food Processing, which in turn holds 36.03 percent in Malee Sampran Factory’ shares. On the
other side, the Chirathiwat family controls 49.58 percent of the publicly traded ABICO Holdings, which holds
41.1 percent of Malee Sampran Factory. The controlling mechanism of the Chirathiwat family is a pyramid
since a listed company, ABICO Holdings, appears in the chain of control.
The ﬁnal example is the ownership structure of International Cosmetics (Figure 4). The pattern of
shareholding of International Cosmetics illustrates all controlling mechanism types deﬁned in this study,
namely direct holdings, indirect holdings via pyramidal holdings, and cross-shareholdings. International
Cosmetics is part of the Saha-Pathanapibul group which is one of the Thai big business groups. The founder
of Saha-Pathanapibul group is the Chokwattana family. The Chokwattana family owns only 0.96 percent of
International Cosmetics directly. However the Chokwattana family controls 20.08 percent of International
Cosmetics indirectly by using the group’s privately held holding companies. The other two large shareholders
of International Cosmetics are Sahapathana Inter-Holdings, and Saha-Pathanapibul and WACOAL. All are
controlled by the Chokwattana family directly and indirectly. These three corporate shareholders are publicly
traded. Therefore the Chokwattana family owns more votes of International Cosmetics through pyramid
companies namely WACOAL, Sahapathana Inter-Holdings, and Saha-Pathanapibul. In total, Chokwattana
family controls 48.58 percent of International Cosmetics. International Cosmetics also holds 5.03 percent
of Sahapathana Inter-Holdings and 4.44 percent of Saha-Pathanapibul. Hence this is also a case of cross-
shareholdings.
[Insert Figure 1 Here]
[Insert Figure 2 Here]
[Insert Figure 3 Here]
[Insert Figure 4 Here]
124 Results and analysis
4.1 Description of controlling shareholders
Table 3 shows that out of 270 ﬁrms, 221 ﬁrms or 81.85 percent of the ﬁrms have controlling shareholders.
Only 49 ﬁrms or 18.15 percent of the ﬁrms do not have any single shareholder who holds more than 25 percent
of the ﬁrms’ shares.3
The number of ﬁrms that are controlled by a single family is the highest. There are 155 ﬁrms that are
controlled by a family, or 55.93 percent of ﬁrms in the sample. The second largest group of investors that
appear as controlling shareholders are foreign investors. There are 36 ﬁrms that are foreign-controlled, or 13.33
percent of the ﬁrms. The Thai government controls 5 ﬁrms, or 2.22 percent. A total of 28 companies, or 10.37
percent of the sample, are controlled by more than one group of investors. These companies are controlled
in one of the following ways: (i) By at least two groups of individuals or families, (ii) by an individual or a
family group and a group of foreign investors, or, (iii) by two groups of foreign investors.
Controlling shareholders involvement in top management varies according to the types of controlling
shareholders. Top management includes the following positions: chairman, honorary chairman, vice-chairman,
president, vice-president, CEO or managing director, and directors of the board. Table 3 shows that out of
223 ﬁrms where a controlling shareholder is present, the controlling shareholder in 185 ﬁrms is involved in
top management. This accounts for 82.51 percent. In family-controlled ﬁrms, the proportion of controlling
shareholder involvement in management is 92.90 percent, whereas in ﬁrms with more than one controlling
shareholder, it is 89.29 percent. In 45.71 percent of foreign-controlled ﬁrms, the controlling shareholder
participates in management.
Panel B shows the incidence of separation of voting and control rights via the adoption of pyramid and
cross-shareholding structures. Surprisingly only 47 companies, or 17.4 percent of the ﬁrms in the sample
deviate from the one-share-one-vote rule.4 Similar to the ﬁndings of La Porta et al. (1999), a pyramid
structure is used more often (40 companies). Only 2 companies implement cross-shareholding structure. And
ﬁve companies are controlled by both pyramid and cross-shareholding structures. Separation of the voting
and cash ﬂow rights occurs more often in family-controlled companies. Out of the 40 ﬁrms with pyramidal
ownership, 28 ﬁrms are family-controlled, 1 is government-controlled, 3 are foreign-controlled, and 7 are
more-than-one-investor-controlled.
[Insert Table 3 Here]
3These ﬁrms are not actually widely held. Average ownership of the largest shareholder of these ﬁrms is 19.24 percent, with
median 18.84 percent (Wiwattanakantang, 2000).
4In the study based on 27 wealthy countries, La Porta et al. (1999) ﬁnd that 26 percent of ﬁrms that have controlling
shareholders are controlled by pyramids. In the cross-country analysis based on nine East Asian countries, Claessens et al.
(2000a) document 40.75 percent of ﬁrms in the sample having the voting rights higher than the cash ﬂow rights.
134.2 Univariate analysis
I begin the analysis by comparing the characteristics, and performance of ﬁrms with and without controlling
shareholders. Firms with controlling shareholders are sub-divided into ﬁrms that are controlled by family,
government, foreign investors and ﬁrms with more than one controlling shareholders. Next, I compare the
performance of ﬁrms where the controlling shareholder is involved in management with those where the
controlling shareholder is not involved in management.
4.2.1 Firms characteristics: With controlling shareholder vs without controlling shareholder
Table 4 presents summary statistics of ﬁrm characteristics for the 270 ﬁrms in the sample. Compared to ﬁrms
without a controlling shareholder, ﬁrms that have controlling shareholders are much larger in size, measured
by either total assets or sales. For example, the mean value of sales of the ﬁrms that have controlling
shareholders is Baht 3,974.93 million, and the median value is Baht 1,707.24 million. The mean and median
sales of the ﬁrms that have no controlling shareholder are Baht 1,427.65 million and Baht 1,156.46 million,
respectively. Regarding other ﬁrms’ characteristics namely age, sales growth and the debt-asset ratio, the
diﬀerences between ﬁrms with and without controlling shareholders are not statistically signiﬁcant.
[Insert Table 4 Here]
4.2.2 The eﬀects of controlling shareholders on performance
Table 5 summarizes the performance of ﬁrms with and without controlling shareholders. The average values
of both the accounting based measures of performance are signiﬁcantly higher for ﬁrms with controlling share-
holders. The average ROA is 7.67 percent for ﬁrms with controlling shareholders, compared to 4.84 percent
for ﬁrms without controlling shareholder. The mean sales-asset ratio for ﬁrms with controlling shareholders
is 0.80 for ﬁrms with controlling shareholders, compared to 0.60 ﬁrms with no controlling shareholder. The
sample means of Tobin’s q for ﬁrms with and without controlling shareholders are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent,
however. With respect to the median values, the diﬀerences in the median values of all the performance mea-
sures for ﬁrms with and without controlling shareholders are not statistically signiﬁcant at the conventional
levels.
Comparing the performance of ﬁrms with diﬀerent types of controlling shareholders and that of ﬁrms with
no controlling shareholder, only foreign controlled ﬁrms perform signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from ﬁrms with no
controlling shareholder, when the performance measures are the ROA and the sales-asset ratios. The mean
and median ROA for foreign controlled ﬁrms are 10.54 and 10.03 percent, respectively. These two values are
signiﬁcantly higher than the mean and median ROA of 4.84 and 6.79 percent for ﬁrms with no controlling
shareholder, respectively. In fact, the mean ROA for foreign-controlled ﬁrms is also superior to that of ﬁrms
that are controlled by family and government. The results also show that ﬁrms with more than one controlling
shareholder have an average sales-asset ratio higher than ﬁrms with no controlling shareholder.
14Table 6 shows a comparison of the performance of ﬁrms where the controlling shareholders hold the top
executive positions and those where the controlling shareholders do not. Panel A and B are the pairwise
comparisons based on the mean and median values of the performance measures, respectively. The mean
and median values of both accounting based measures are signiﬁcantly higher for ﬁrms where the controlling
shareholders are not involved in management. For example, the mean ROA for ﬁrms where the controlling
shareholder is involved in management is 4 percent with median 4.20 percent, whereas the mean ROA for ﬁrms
where the controlling shareholder is not involved in management is 7.82 percent with median 7.07 percent.
With respect to Tobin’s q, the diﬀerences in both the mean and median values when the ﬁrms are managed
by the controlling shareholders or not are not statistically signiﬁcant from zero.
Foreign investors’ involvement in management is associated with signiﬁcantly lower performance measured
by the accounting measures: the ROA and sales-asset ratio. For example, ﬁrms that are owned but not run by
foreign investors have a mean ROA of 12.46 percent, signiﬁcantly higher than the mean ROA of 7.98 percent
for the ﬁrms where the controlling shareholder is involved in management.
In summary, applying univariate tests, we do not ﬁnd evidence to support the argument that controlling
shareholders divert corporate assets in such a way that the ﬁrms turn out to have poorer performance. In
fact, when performance measures are the accounting ones, ﬁrms where controlling shareholders exist have
means ROA and the sales-asset ratio signiﬁcantly higher than those of ﬁrms without controlling shareholder.
The evidence suggests that family and foreign controlled ﬁrms have signiﬁcantly higher sales-asset ratio,
relative to ﬁrms with no controlling shareholder. The univariate comparisons show, however, that ﬁrms where
the controlling shareholders participate in management do perform worse than ﬁrms where the controlling
shareholders do not participate in management.
[Insert Table 5 Here]
[Insert Table 6 Here]
4.3 Multivariate regression analysis
4.3.1 The eﬀects of the presence of controlling shareholders and the control mechanisms
The multivariate analysis of the eﬀect of controlling shareholders n performance are presented in Table 7.
Panel A reports the results when the performance measures are accounting based: the ROA, and sales-asset
ratios. Panel B reports the results when the performance measures are Tobin’s q. The eﬀect of the presence
of controlling shareholder is represented by the dummy variable, Presence of controlling shareholder. The
estimated coeﬃcients are positive and signiﬁcant at the 5 and 10 percent levels, when the dependent variables
are the ROA, and the sales-asset ratio, respectively (model (1) and (4)). When the performance measure is
Tobin’s q, the coeﬃcients are positive but not signiﬁcant. The results indicate that after controlling for other
eﬀects, ﬁrms with controlling shareholders are signiﬁcantly more proﬁtable based on the accounting measures,
15than ﬁrms with no controlling shareholder.
Previous studies argue that controlling shareholders might extract more private beneﬁts and divert cor-
porate assets at some level of shareholdings. To account for the possibility that variation in ownership levels
aﬀects corporate value, ﬁrms are categorized into 4 groups according to the shares held by the largest share-
holder group. The levels of ownership are [25-50), [50-75), and [75-100]. In other words, the coeﬃcients on
these dummy variables measure the performance of each category of controlling shareholders relative to ﬁrms
where the ownership of the largest shareholder is less than 25 percent. The cut-oﬀ levels of the ownership is
chosen based on the Thai public company law. The legal rights of each category of ownership can be referred
in Section 3.5.
The estimated coeﬃcients on these three variables are positive in all the regressions. There is a very
strong and signiﬁcant positive relation between the ﬁrst two ownership levels and the ROA, at the 1 and 5
percent levels, respectively. The relation between the [75-100] category of ownership and the ROA is weaker,
signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level, however. Regarding the relation between the ownership categories and the
sales-asset ratio, only the coeﬃcients on the ownership levels of [50-75) and [75-100] are signiﬁcant at the 10,
and 5 percent levels, respectively. In the Tobin’s q regressions, the coeﬃcients on the ownership levels are
signiﬁcant only when the ownership level is [25-50), at the 9 percent level.
These results indicate that the ﬁrm’s value is not negatively aﬀected by the presence of controlling share-
holders. In fact, the evidence shows that ﬁrms with concentrated ownership outperform ﬁrms where the
largest shareholder has smaller stakes. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that the expropriation
problems are less serious if the controlling shareholders hold a large proportion of the shares, thereby inter-
nalizing a higher proportion of any expropriation costs they incur. The results are similar to Claessens et al.
(2000a), Lins (2000) and Yeh and Lee (2000). Claessens et al. (2000a) use data on nine East Asian countries.
Lins (2000) uses data on 22 emerging economies. And Yeh and Lee (2000) use data on Taiwanese ﬁrms.
These ﬁndings, however, are diﬀerent from the ﬁndings of Cronqvist and Nilsson (2000). Using data of
Swedish ﬁrms, they ﬁnd that ownership of the controlling shareholders is negatively associated with Tobin’s q.
The results are diﬀerent probably due to the diﬀerences in the ownership and control structures used by Thai
and Swedish ﬁrms.In Sweden, the deviation from one share one vote rule is extensively used via dual-class
shares. In contrast, as shown previously the practice is relatively rare in Thailand. Therefore, compared
to Thai ﬁrms, in Sweden the expropriation problem is likely to be more serious because the controlling
shareholders are able to externalize most of costs of any self-dealing activities they carry out.
To test the eﬀect of control mechanisms used to deviate from one-share-one-vote on performance, I create a
dummy variable, Pyramids, to diﬀerentiate between ﬁrms that implement pyramid and/or cross-shareholding
structures and those that do not. The results are shown in model (3) and (6) in Panel A, and model (3) in
Panel B. The estimated coeﬃcients are insigniﬁcant in all models. That is, the evidence does not support
the argument that the the mechanisms employed to separation voting and cash ﬂow rights reduces corporate
16value. This ﬁnding is in line with the cross-country regression in Lins (2000), who uses similar measure.
The results in this study, however, are diﬀerent from Claessens et al. (2000a). They ﬁnd that the deviations
from cash ﬂow rights and voting rights is value decreasing in Japan, Indonesia, Thailand and Philippines.
The analysis in this study diﬀers from Claessens et al. (2000a) in the variable used to measure the violation
of control and cash ﬂow rights. Claessens et al. (2000a) try to measure the degree of expropriation via the
separation of ownership and control by introducing a variable: the ratio of cash ﬂow rights to voting rights.
In this study, however, the Pyramids variable represents only ﬁrms that use pyramid or cross-shareholding
structures, and it does not incorporate the magnitude of the deviation between voting and cash ﬂow rights. I
do not try to measure the degree of the deviation between voting and cash ﬂow rights because I do not have a
theoretically appropriate methodology. Existing theory does not provide appropriate guidance for computing
accurate measures.
[Insert Table 7 Here]
4.3.2 The eﬀects of controlling shareholders’ involvement in management
The eﬀect of controlling shareholders’ involvement in management is captured by a dummy variable, CS
involvement in management, which indicates whether the ﬁrm is run by the controlling shareholder and
members of his family. Regression results are reported in speciﬁcation (1), (3), and (5) of Table 8. The
estimated coeﬃcient of CS involvement in management is negative and signiﬁcant only when the dependent
variables are the accounting measures, at the 10 percent level. The regression results support the ﬁndings
based on the univariate tests. That is, controlling shareholders who run the ﬁrms are likely to consume private
beneﬁts, therefore are detrimental to the ﬁrm value. Similar results are also shown in Cronqvist and Nilsson
(2000) in the case of Swedish ﬁrms.
Additional test is conducted to analyze whether the agency costs incurred by controlling shareholder-
and-managers occur uniformly over all the range of ownership level. To address the issue, I create 3 dummy
variables, CS-manager owners [25-50) , CS-manager owners [50-75), and CS-manager owners[75-100] . These
variables represent ﬁrms where the level of ownership of the controlling shareholders who are the ﬁrm’s
managers are [25-50), [50-75), and [75-100]. Note that in this study, the ownership by the management (who
are also the controlling shareholders) is a block shareholding. This variable is diﬀerent from most studies in
this area, where insider ownership is often the aggregation of the managers.
Estimated results are shown in the models (2), (4) and (6). The results suggest that ﬁrms where the
controlling-shareholder-and-managers own between 25-50 percent have lower ROA and sales-asset ratios,
compared to ﬁrms where the controlling shareholders do not hold management positions. In the Tobin’s q
model, the coeﬃcient associate with the dummy variable indicating the ownership level [75-100] is positive,
but is weakly signiﬁcant at the 13 percent level.
Overall, the results show that the expropriation problems seem to be more serious when the controlling
17shareholders are involved in the management. The agency costs, however, are not linearly related to the
ownership of the management. Based on the results from the regressions using the accounting measures
of performance, the management group who is also the controlling shareholder is likely to be entrenched
when they have 25-50 percent stakes of the ﬁrms. Based on the results from the Tobin’s q regressions, when
the controlling shareholder-and-managers have extremely concentrated ownership (between 75-100 percent),
their interests might align to those of outside investors which is consistent with the hypothesis of Jensen and
Meckling (1976).
[Insert Table 8 Here]
4.3.3 The eﬀects of the types of controlling shareholders
Table 9 explores the eﬀects of types of controlling shareholders on corporate performance. Four dummy
variables are used to diﬀerentiate between the eﬀects of the groups. Speciﬁcally, these variables indicating
whether the ﬁrms are controlled by family, government, foreign investor, and ﬁrms with more than one
controlling shareholder. The estimated results are somewhat consistent with the ﬁndings the univariate
test. In the ROA regression, the coeﬃcients of family, foreign investor, and ﬁrms with with more than one
controlling shareholder are positive and signiﬁcant at conventional levels (model (1)). The results suggest that
family and foreign controlled ﬁrms as well as ﬁrms with more than one controlling shareholder have higher
ROA, relative to ﬁrms with no controlling shareholder.
Regression results when the sales-asset ratio and Tobin’s q are the dependent variables yield similar ﬁndings
(model (3) and (5)). Firms with with more than one controlling shareholder have signiﬁcantly superior
performance than those with no controlling shareholder. The coeﬃcients, however, are weakly signiﬁcant
at the 10, and 12 percent levels in the model when the regressors are the sales-asset ratio and Tobin’s q,
respectively.
In unreported regressions, I changed the underlying category from ﬁrms with no controlling shareholder
to foreign-controlled ﬁrms. The results are unchanged. More speciﬁcally, the coeﬃcients of the variable ﬁrms
with no controlling shareholder are negative and signiﬁcant at the 5 and 12 percent when the performance
is measured by the ROA and sales-asset ratio, respectively. No signiﬁcant result was observed when the
dependent variable was the Tobin’s q. In addition, I did not ﬁnd any evidence that family-controlled ﬁrms
have signiﬁcant lower performance, as measures by the ROA, sales-asset ratio and Tobin’s q. The results
reveal that family-controlled ﬁrms do not poorly perform, compared to foreign-controlled ﬁrms and ﬁrms
with no controlling shareholder. The evidence, therefore, suggests that we cannot accept the hypothesis that
families are opportunistic, and expropriate corporate assets for their own purposes, that are detrimental to
corporate performance. In contrast, family relationship might provide incentives and improve monitoring.
The ﬁnding that foreign ownership concentration is positively related to performance is similar to the
ﬁndings of Boardman et al. (1997), and Chhibber and Majumdar (1999). The superior performance of
18foreign-controlled ﬁrms reﬂects that foreign ownership mitigates the agency problem, the superior technology
foreign ﬁrms have as well as the the tax and other beneﬁts obtaining from the investment promotion schemes
of the Thai government. This issue needs further investigation.
In model (2), (4), and (6), I test whether the ownership held by each category of controlling shareholder
aﬀects the ﬁrm’s value. No signiﬁcant results are observed, however. When the level of ownership variables
are included in the regressions, only the estimated coeﬃcient of the variable indicating family-controlled
ﬁrms remains signiﬁcantly at the 5 percent (model (2)). The result indicates that family-controlled ﬁrms
are associated with higher ROA, relative to ﬁrms with no controlling shareholder. This result conﬁrms the
previous ﬁnding that family-owned ﬁrms do not have severe the agency problems.
I replicate the regression as in Table 8 to test whether the involvement in management by the four types of
controlling shareholders aﬀects performance. The results are reported in Table 10. The results in speciﬁcation
(1), (3), and (5) show that the coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant (at the 1 percent) only when the sales-asset ratio is
the dependent variable. Speciﬁcally, only coeﬃcients associated with the variable that indicates ﬁrms where
foreign controlling shareholders are in the management team (Foreign investor*Involved) are signiﬁcant. The
results reveal that ﬁrms that are controlled and managed by a group of foreign investors have signiﬁcantly
lower sales-asset ratio than foreign ﬁrms that are not run by their controlling shareholders. The evidence are
in line with the results of the univariate analysis.
To test whether ownership by manager-and-controlling shareholder in each category of the controlling
shareholders eﬀect performance, I interact the 4 dummy variables representing types of controlling sharehold-
ers, Involved, and their shareholdings. Speciﬁcation (2), (4), and (6) report the results of this analysis. The
results show that there is a signiﬁcant negative relation between the ownership of manager-and-controlling
shareholders who are foreign investors and the two accounting measures of performance. The coeﬃcients are
strongly signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level in the model when the dependent variable is the sales-asset ratio,
but weakly signiﬁcant at the 14 percent level in the model when the ROA is the regressors. The ﬁndings
support our previous evidence that foreign controlled ﬁrms where the controlling shareholders are involved in
management are associated with larger expropriation problems than those that are not run by their control-
ling shareholders. Carefully examining these ﬁrms, I found that foreign-controlled ﬁrms that are run and not
run by their controlling shareholders have somewhat diﬀerent characteristics. The controlling shareholders of
those foreign-controlled ﬁrms that are run by their controlling shareholders are individuals who are foreigners.
Foreign-controlled ﬁrms that are run by professional managers have multinational corporations as controlling
shareholders. These managers own no stakes in the ﬁrms.
The regression results again reveal that there is no evidence of expropriation by families. Family’s in-
volvement in running the ﬁrm is not associated with lower corporate value. The results, however, show a
weak relationship between the sale-asset ratio and the ownership by manager-and-controlling shareholders in
family-controlled ﬁrms. The estimated coeﬃcient is positive and signiﬁcant at the 11 percent level (model
19(4)).
[Insert Table 9 Here]
[Insert Table 10 Here]
4.4 Sensitivity checks
There are at least 2 issues to consider when evaluating ownership-performance analysis. First whether the
results are robust to performance measurement. In unreported tests, I replicate the regressions in this section
using the ratio of income before tax to total assets. The results remain unchanged across these alternative
measures.
Second is the issue that is often raised in the US based studies. That is, whether ownership and per-
formance are endogenously determined. In such a case, the causality might not always run from ownership
to performance. The reverse direction might also be true. For example, the positive relationship between
performance and ownership might reﬂect that better performing ﬁrms are attractive to investors, causing
investors to purchase more shares. It may also reﬂect that better performing ﬁrms award equity shares to
the management. Because of the following diﬀerences in institutions, the endogeneity problem might not be
relevant in the case of Thailand. First, similar to other developing economies, the use of stock options to
provide incentives to management is not common. Second, the ownership structure of Thai ﬁrms has been
stable over time. Change of controlling shareholders is rare. There are only 10 companies in the sample that
have had a complete change in the controlling shareholder groups since going public. Most of the ﬁrms have
had the same controlling shareholders since establishment.
This phenomenon is indeed consistent with the hypothesis of Gomes (2000). He contends that in choosing
the optimal levels of ownership structure before the IPO , owners maximize their net private beneﬁts of
control and their shares of the cash ﬂows. In the complete information model, the model predicts that the
owners divest large stakes soon after the IPO, and tend to keep their ownership constant and remain as the
controlling shareholders of the ﬁrms afterwards. In the incomplete model, the ownership by the controlling
shareholders, however, decreases with the level of the agency costs.
5 Summary and conclusion
This study investigates the eﬀects of ownership concentration on agency costs. Based on both the univariate
and multivariate analyses, we do not ﬁnd that the evidence supports the hypothesis that controlling share-
holders expropriate corporate assets, hence resulting in lower ﬁrm value. In contrast, ﬁrms where controlling
shareholders exist have superior performance, when measured by the accounting measures: the ROA and the
sales-asset ratio. The implementation of control mechanisms to separate control rights from cash ﬂow rights
is not common. Only 17.4 percent of ﬁrms in the sample use pyramid and cross-shareholding structures. The
20regression results indicate that the separation of voting and cash ﬂow rights has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the
performance. The ﬁrms that adopt pyramid and cross-shareholding structure do not perform signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from ﬁrms that do not employ these control mechanisms.
These results suggest that the controlling shareholders seem to be self-constrained not to extract private
beneﬁts for themselves. Since in most of the ﬁrms, voting and cash ﬂow rights are not separated, the controlling
shareholders, hence, cannot externalize most of the costs of expropriation. The results reveal that instead of
diverting corporate assets, the controlling shareholders seem to act as monitors who increase the value of the
ﬁrm for other stakeholders.
The analysis casts some doubt on the argument that controlling shareholder involvement in management
has a negative eﬀect on the performance. The univariate and multivariate analyses suggest that the accounting
measures of performance of ﬁrms managed by their controlling shareholders are lower than that of ﬁrms where
controlling shareholders do not participate in management. The evidence reveals that controlling shareholder-
and-managers become entrenched at the 25-50 percent ownership level. At this level of shareholdings, the
controlling shareholder-and-managers gain signiﬁcant control over the ﬁrm and may utilize this power to divert
corporate resources to his own interests. When their ownership is extremely concentrated at higher than 75
percent, the ownership is positively associated with Tobin’s q. Even though the result is weakly signiﬁcant
at the 13 percent level, it implies that for managers who own a larger fraction of the ﬁrms’ shares, the results
of non-value maximization activities will be ﬁnally borne by themselves according to the proportion of their
stakes. Consequently, the interests of owner-managers and outside shareholders converge.
Firms that are controlled by families, the government and ﬁrms with more than one controlling shareholders
have signiﬁcantly higher proﬁtability than ﬁrms with no controlling shareholder. The empirical evidence also
shows that ﬁrms that are controlled by families do not have signiﬁcantly lower performance than foreign-
controlled ﬁrms. The involvement of families in managing the ﬁrms is not signiﬁcantly associated with all
performance measures. The results, therefore, indicate that families do not incur higher expropriation costs.
Instead, families seem to provide good monitoring and incentive alignment to that of other stakeholders.
Due to data limitations, this study focuses on the cross-sectional relation among the variables. Further
investigation using panel data certainly should give better understanding about the eﬀects of ownership on
the ﬁrm’s value.
More work remains to be done on the net eﬀects of concentrated ownership in emerging markets. Up
to date, research has focused on the direct relationship between ownership and performance. It is also of
interest to investigate the indirect relationship via the behavior of the controlling shareholders. For example,
controlling shareholders’ discretion over corporate decisions, such as capital structure, investment decisions,
compensation schemes, management successions, and dividend policy.
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24Table 1: Sample Description
This table presents characteristics of 270 companies in the sample. The sample consists of non-ﬁnancial
companies listed in the Stock Exchange of Thailand in 1996. Accounting data is for consolidated companies,
obtained from the Stock Exchange of Thailand.
Panel A: Companies in the sample, classiﬁed by industries
Industry No. of companies
Agribusiness 28
Building materials 29
Chemicals and plastics 11
Commerce 12
Communication 10
Electrical products and computer 9
Electrical components 5
Energy 5
Entertainment and recreation 6
Food and beverages 20
Health care services 12
Hotel and travel services 9
Household goods 5
Machinery and equipment 5
Packaging 16
Printing and publishing 9
Property development 29
Pulp and paper 5
Textile 20
Transportation 6
Vehicles and parts 8
Others 11
Total 270
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for the Sample
Mean Median Max Min
Book value of total assets 7,140.71 2,428.76 179,785 325.81
Sales revenue 3,531.52 1,544.03 107,273.01 11.31
Market value of equity 4,485.53 926.94 118,930.5 47.20
Number of years incorporated 21.02 17 120 2
Note: Values are in million Baht.
25Table 2: Description of Variables used in This Study
Variable Description
Performance measures
ROA Ratio of proﬁt before interest and tax to total assets.
Sales-asset ratio Ratio of sales to total assets
Tobin’s q Ratio of the market to the book value of equity.
Independent variables
Ownership variables
Presence of controlling shareholder Dummy variable, indicating if the ﬁrm
has a controlling shareholder.
Family Dummy variable, indicating if the ﬁrm has
a controlling shareholder who is an individual.
Government Dummy variable, indicating if the ﬁrm has
a controlling shareholder who is the government
Foreign investor Dummy variable, indicating if the ﬁrm has
a controlling shareholder who is a foreign investor.
More than one controlling shareholder Dummy variable, indicating if the ﬁrm has
more than one controlling shareholder.
Controlling shareholder owns [25-50) Dummy variable, indicating if the controlling
shareholder owns [25-50) of the shares
Controlling shareholder owns [50-75) Dummy variable, indicating if the controlling
shareholder owns [50-75) of the shares
Controlling shareholder owns [75-100] Dummy variable, indicating if the controlling
shareholder owns [75-100] of the shares
CS involvement in management Dummy variable, indicating if
the controlling shareholder and his family
are present among the ﬁrm’s top management.
CS-manager owners [25-50) Dummy variable, indicating if the controlling
shareholder is involved in the management
and owns [25-50) of the shares
CS-manager owners [50-75) Dummy variable, indicating if the controlling
shareholder is involved in the management
and owns [50-75) of the shares
CS-manager owners [75-100] Dummy variable, indicating if the controlling
shareholder is involved in the management
and owns [75-100] of the shares
Pyramids Dummy variable, indicating if there exists
pyramids and/or cross-shareholdings
Control variables
Sales growth Percentage change in sales,
averaged over the period 1992-96.
Size Log of total assets.
Age Number of years since incorporation.
Debt-asset ratio Ratio of debt to total assets.
Business group Dummy variable, taking the value of 1 if the ﬁrm
belongs to one of the 23 largest business groups.
26Table 3: Description of Controlling Shareholder
This table presents the characteristics of controlling shareholders. Panel A shows the identity of controlling
shareholders, and the extent of their involvement in management. Firms are classiﬁed into each category
according to their controlling shareholders. Involved represents the case when controlling shareholders are
involved in management as oﬃcers and directors. The table also shows the percentage of ﬁrms where the
controlling shareholders are involved in the management. Panel B presents the number of ﬁrms that use
control mechanisms such as pyramids and cross-shareholdings. Firms that do not implement pyramids and
cross-shareholdings are categorized as using a simple structure. The ”% ” column presents the percentage of
ﬁrms with conrolling shareholders that implement a given control mechanism.
Panel A: Identity of Controlling Shareholders
No. of Involved Not involved
ﬁrms No. of ﬁrms % No. of ﬁrms %
Full sample 270 185 68.52 85 31.48
Firms with controlling shareholder 223 185 82.96 38 17.04
Family 155 144 92.90 11 7.10
Government 5 - - 5 100.00
Foreign investors 35 16 45.71 19 54.29
More than one controlling shareholder 28 25 89.29 3 10.71
Firms with no controlling shareholder 47 - - - -
Panel B: Controlling Shareholders and the Control Mechanisms
Simple (1) Cross-share (2) Pyramids (3) Both (2) and(3)
Type of controlling No. of % No. of % No. of % No. of %
shareholder ﬁrms ﬁrms ﬁrms ﬁrms
Family 124 80.00 0 0.00 28 18.06 3 1.94
Government 4 80.00 0 0.00 1 20.00 0 0.00
Foreign investor 32 91.43 0 0.00 3 8.57 0 0.00
More than one 16 57.14 2 7.14 8 28.57 2 7.14
controlling shareholder
Firms with controlling 176 78.92 2 9.00 40 17.94 5 2.24
shareholder
27Table 4: Summary Statistics of Firms Characteristics
Firms are classiﬁed into 2 categories: ﬁrms with controlling shareholders and ﬁrms with no controlling share-
holder. A controlling shareholder is a shareholder who owns at least 25 percent of a ﬁrm’s shares. The
summary statistics in this table are the mean and median of variables based on 1996 values. Total assets and
sales are in millions of Baht, with an approximate exchange rate at the end of 1996 of one U.S.$ equal to
26 Baht. Mean (median) diﬀerences are tested using the t-test and the Wilcoxon signed rank test. , 
indicate statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences when compared with the ﬁrms with no controlling shareholder at
the 1 and 5 percent levels, respectively.




Assets (Baht million) 7,140.71 7,752.09 4,239.87
(2,428.76) (2,428.87) (2,006.34)
Sales (Baht million) 3,531.52 3,974.93 1,427.65
(1,544.03) (1,707.24) (1,156.46)
Age of ﬁrms (years) 21.02 21.41 19.17
(17.00) (17.00) (17.5)
Sales growth 0.28 0.28 0.29
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Debt-asset ratio 0.43 0.44 0.38
(0.44) (0.46) (0.38)
Number of ﬁrms 270 223 47
28Table 5: A Comparison of Performance: Firms with Controlling Shareholder versus Firms with no Controlling
Shareholder
This table provides a comparison of the performance of ﬁrms with and without controlling shareholders.
Performance is measured by ROA, Sales/asset and Tobin’s q. Signiﬁcance level refers to the diﬀerence of
mean and median tests between ﬁrms with controlling shareholders, including the four groups of controlling
shareholders, and ﬁrms without controlling shareholder. Two-tailed t-statistic from a parametric test are
used for the pairwise comparison of means. Wilcoxon signed rank tests are used for the pairwise comparison
of medians. , ,  indicates statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence when compared with the ﬁrms with no
controlling shareholder at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.
ROA (%) Sales/asset Tobin’s q
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Full sample 7.18 7.47 0.77 0.62 1.17 0.98
Firms with controlling shareholder 7.67 7.64 0.80 0.64 1.18 0.98
Family 7.03 7.21 0.78 0.62 1.18 0.97
Government 5.12 9.43 0.55 0.43 1.65 0.98
Foreign investor 10.54 10.03 0.90 0.79 1.12 0.98
More than one controlling shareholder 8.11 6.70 0.81 0.70 1.23 1.13
Firms with no controlling shareholder 4.84 6.79 0.60 0.48 1.14 0.94
29Table 6: A Comparison of Performance: Involvement in Management versus not Involvement
This table provides a comparison of the performance of ﬁrms where controlling shareholders are involved in
management against ﬁrms where controlling shareholders are not involved in top management. Top man-
agement includes oﬃcers and directors. Panel A and B show the results of mean and median comparisons,
respectively. Two-tailed t-statistic from a parametric test are used for the pairwise comparison of means.
Wilcoxon signed rank tests are used for the pairwise comparison of medians. , ,  indicates statistically
signiﬁcant diﬀerence when compared with ﬁrms where the controlling shareholder is involved in management
at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.
Panel A: A Comparison of Means
Not involved in management Involved in management
ROA Sales/asset Tobin’s q ROA Sales/asset Tobin’s q
(%) (%)
Firms with controlling share-
holder
10.45 0.85 1.27 7.10 0.79 1.16
Family 9.07 0.48 1.24 6.88 0.80 1.16
Government 5.12 0.55 1.65 - - -
Foreign investor 12.46 1.12 1.23 7.98 0.62 0.96
More than one controlling
shareholder
11.34 0.96 0.92 7.86 0.80 1.29
Panel B: A Comparison of Medians
Not involved in management Involved in management
ROA Sales/asset Tobin’s q ROA Sales/asset Tobin’s q
(%) (%)
Firms with controlling share-
holder
9.63 0.69 1.02 7.21 0.63 0.97
Family 7.64 0.44 1.03 7.21 0.65 0.97
Government 9.43 0.43 0.98 - - -
Foreign investor 10.60 1.00 1.05 9.08 0.48 0.86
More than one controlling
shareholder
11.34 0.96 0.92 6.66 0.64 1.16
30Table 7: The Eﬀects of Controlling Shareholders on performance
ROA is the ratio of proﬁt before interest and tax to total assets. Sales-asset ratio is the ratio of sales to total
assets. Tobin’s q is the ratio of the market to the book value of equity. In Panel A, the dependent variables
are the accounting performance: the ROA and sales-asset ratio. In model (1)-(3), the dependent variable
is the ROA. In model (4)-(6), the dependent variable is the sales-asset ratio. In Panel B, the dependent
variable is Tobin’s q. Presence of controlling shareholder is a dummy variable, taking the value of 1 if the
ﬁrm has a controlling shareholder. Controlling shareholder owns [25-50), Controlling shareholder owns [50-
75), and Controlling shareholder owns [75-100] are dummy variables, taking the value of 1 if the controlling
shareholder owns [25-50), [50-75), and [75-100] of the shares, respectively. Pyramids is a dummy variable,
taking the value of 1 if the ﬁrm implements pyramid and/or cross-shareholding structure. The regression
method is the OLS. Each speciﬁcation includes a set of 21 industry dummies but the results are suppressed.
p-values for two-tailed t-test are in parentheses. , ,  indicate signiﬁcance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent
levels, respectively.
Panel A: The Dependent Variables are ROA and Sales-Asset Ratio
ROA Sales-asset ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Presence of controlling shareholder 0.035 0.036 0.140 0.127
(0.02) (0.02) (0.09) (0.13)
Controlling shareholder owns [25-50) 0.031 0.097
(0.05) (0.27)
Controlling shareholder owns [50-75) 0.042 0.171
(0.01) (0.06)




Sales growth 0.03 0.029 0.033 0.114 0.105 0.112
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.13) (0.16) (0.14)
Log (age) 0.018 0.018 0.019 0.060 0.052 0.060
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.24) (0.31) (0.25)
Log (asset) 0.012 0.013 0.012 -0.049 -0.043 -0.048
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 0.15 0.20 0.15
Debt/asset -0.113 -0.116 -0.113 -0.74 -0.778 -0.728
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Business group -0.009 -0.008 -0.009 -0.008 -0.016 -0.050
(0.54) (0.54) (0.55) (0.92) (0.84) (0.56)
Intercept -0.132 -0.141 -0.137 2.366 2.299 2.354
(0.11) (0.09) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Adjusted R2 0.142 0.141 0.139 0.421 0.427 0.422
F-statistic 2.64 2.520 2.550 8.25 7.910 8.02
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
31Panel B: The Dependent Variable is Tobin’s q
(1) (2) (3)
Presence of controlling shareholder 0.097 0.107
(0.40) (0.35)
Controlling shareholder owns [25-50) 0.015
(0.90)
Controlling shareholder owns [50-75) 0.147
(0.24)




Sales growth 0.296 -0.039 0.297
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Log (age) -0.032 0.011 -0.031
(0.65) (0.58) (0.66)
Log (asset) 0.007 -0.400 0.006
(0.88) (0.81) (0.90)
Debt/asset -0.380 0.007 -0.387
(0.09) (0.08) (0.09)
Bussiness group 0.006 0.007 0.036
(0.96) (0.95) (0.76)
Intercept 1.056 1.023 1.069
(0.10) (0.11) (0.09)
Adjusted R2 0.134 0.136 0.131
F-statistic 2.6 2.52 2.51
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00
32Table 8: The Eﬀect of Controlling Shareholders’ Involvement in Management
ROA is the ratio of proﬁt before interest and tax to total assets. Sales-asset ratio is the ratio of sales to total
assets. Tobin’s q is the ratio of the market to the book value of equity. In model (1)-(2), the dependent
variables are the ROA. In model (3)-(4), the dependent variables are the sales to total assets ratio. In model
(5)-(6), the dependent variables are Tobin’s q. Family, Government, Foreign investor, and More than one CS
are dummy variables, indicating if the ﬁrm has a controlling shareholder who is an individual, the government,
a foreign investor, and the ﬁrm with more than one controlling shareholder, respectively. CS involvement in
management is a dummy variable, indicating if the controlling shareholder and his family are present among
the ﬁrm’s top management. CS-manager owns [25-50), CS-manager owns [50-75), and CS-manager owns
[75-100] are dummy variables, indicating if the controlling shareholder owns [25-50), [50-75), and [75-100] of
the shares, respectively. The regression method is the OLS. Each speciﬁcation includes a set of 21 industry
dummies but the results are suppressed. p-values for two-tailed t-test are in parentheses. , ,  indicate
signiﬁcance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.
ROA Sales-asset ratio Tobin’s q
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Presence of controlling shareholder 0.057 0.053 0.261 0.247 0.102 0.094
(0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.50) (0.54)
CS involvement in management -0.027 -0.151 -0.004
(0.10) (0.10) (0.97)
CS-manager owns [25-50) -0.029 -0.171 -0.099
(0.10) (0.08) (0.46)
CS-manager owns [50-75) -0.019 -0.114 0.089
(0.28) (0.24) (0.50)
CS-manager owns [75-100] 0.002 0.059 0.368
(0.94) (0.74) (0.13)
Sales growth 0.030 0.029 0.115 0.108 0.296 0.275
(0.02) (0.03) (0.12) (0.15) (0.01) (0.01)
Log (age) 0.017 0.016 0.054 0.047 -0.032 -0.045
(0.06) (0.08) (0.30) (0.37) (0.65) (0.53)
Log (asset) 0.010 0.011 -0.060 -0.056 0.004 0.010
(0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) (0.93) (0.83)
Debt/asset -0.101 -0.106 -0.673 -0.706 -0.373 -0.45
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.11) (0.06)
Business group -0.004 -0.006 0.018 0.001 0.008 -0.018
(0.78) (0.66) (0.82) (0.99) (0.94) (0.69)
Intercept -0.103 -0.111 2.530 2.481 1.078 1.002
0.22 0.19 (0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.13)
Adjusted R2 0.148 0.144 0.425 0.425 0.147 0.144
F-statistic 2.66 2.50 8.11 7.630 2.54 2.5
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.001 0.00
33Table 9: The Eﬀects of Types of Controlling Shareholders
ROA is the ratio of proﬁt before interest and tax to total assets. Sales-asset ratio is the ratio of sales to total
assets. Tobin’s q is the ratio of the market to the book value of equity. In model (1)-(2), the dependent
variables are the ROA. In model (3)-(4), the dependent variables are the sales to total assets ratio. In model
(5)-(6), the dependent variables are Tobin’s q. Family, Government, Foreign investor, and More than one CS
are dummy variables, indicating if the ﬁrm has a controlling shareholder who is an individual, the government,
a foreign investor, and the ﬁrm with more than one controlling shareholder, respectively. Ownership is the
percentage of shares held by the controlling shareholder The regression method is the OLS. Each speciﬁcation
includes a set of 21 industry dummies but the results are suppressed. p-values for two-tailed t-test are in
parentheses. , ,  indicate signiﬁcance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.
ROA Sales-asset ratio Tobin’s q
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Family 0.033 0.032 0.123 0.114 0.087 0.096
(0.03) (0.04) (0.16) (0.19) (0.47) (0.43)
Government 0.020 -0.034 0.105 -0.478 0.101 0.682
(0.65) (0.72) (0.67) (0.38) (0.77) (0.36)
Foreign investor 0.047 0.043 0.181 -0.055 0.066 0.277
(0.02) (0.47) (0.12) (0.87) (0.68) (0.54)
More than one CS 0.036 0.089 0.204 -0.056 0.265 -0.196
(0.10) (0.15) (0.10) (0.87) (0.12) (0.68)
Family * Ownership 0.001 0.008 -0.004
(0.47) (0.39) (0.73)
Government * Ownership 0.128 1.425 -1.419
(0.55) (0.23) (0.39)
Foreign investor * Ownership 0.007 0.505 -0.453
(0.95) (0.46) (0.63)
More than one CS * Ownership -0.119 0.576 1.039
(0.36) (0.43) (0.30)
Sales growth 0.032 0.030 0.110 0.110 0.299 0.291
(0.03) (0.03) (0.14) (0.15) (0.00) (0.00)
Log (age) 0.018 0.017 0.053 0.049 -0.032 -0.031
(0.06) (0.07) (0.32) (0.36) (0.66) (0.68)
Log (asset) 0.012 0.013 -0.051 -0.052 0.004 0.001
0.05 (0.04) (0.14) (0.14) (0.93) (0.98)
Debt/asset -0.109 -0.111 -0.725 -0.723 -0.379 -0.379
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.1) (0.11)
Business group -0.006 -0.006 -0.004 -0.007 -0.027 -0.033
(0.70) (0.71) (0.96) (0.93) (0.82) (0.78)
Intercept -0.130 -0.139 2.409 2.444 1.078 1.124
(0.13) (0.11) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.10)
Adjusted R2 0.1345 0.125 0.4161 0.415 0.126 0.119
F-statistic 2.39 2.130 7.39 6.600 2.29 2.070
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.001
34Table 10: Types of Controlling Shareholders and their Involvement in Management
ROA is the ratio of proﬁt before interest and tax to total assets. Sales-asset ratio is the ratio of sales to total
assets. Tobin’s q is the ratio of the market to the book value of equity. In model (1)-(2), the dependent
variables are the ROA. In model (3)-(4), the dependent variables are the sales to total assets ratio. In
model (5)-(6), the dependent variables are Tobin’s q. Family, Government, Foreign investor, and More than
one CS are dummy variables, indicating if the ﬁrm has a controlling shareholder who is an individual, the
government, a foreign investor, and the ﬁrm with more than one controlling shareholder, respectively. Involved
is a dummy variable, indicating if the controlling shareholder and his family are present among the ﬁrm’s
top management. Ownership is the percentage of shares held by the management who is the controlling
shareholder. The regression method is the OLS. Each speciﬁcation includes a set of 21 industry dummies but
the results are suppressed. p-values for two-tailed t-test are in parentheses. , ,  indicate signiﬁcance at
the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.
ROA Sales-asset ratio Tobin’s q
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Family 0.063 0.050 0.112 -0.030 0.107 -0.054
(0.04) (0.03) (0.51) (0.82) (0.65) (0.77)
Government 0.018 0.019 0.106 0.108 0.098 0.98
(0.68) (0.67) (0.66) (0.66) (0.78) (0.77)
Foreign investor 0.064 0.064 0.413 0.407 0.131 0.125
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.50) (0.51)
More than one controlling shareholder 0.047 0.027 0.105 0.004 -0.066 -0.047
(0.45) (0.53) (0.76) (0.99) (0.89) (0.89)
Family * Involved -0.032 0.011 -0.02
(0.25) (0.94) (0.93)
Foreign investors * Involved -0.043 -0.533 -0.154
(0.16) (0.00) (0.52)
More than one CS * Involved -0.012 0.106 0.359
(0.85) (0.77) (0.47)
Family * Involved * Ownership -0.036 0.328 0.307
(0.33) (0.11) (0.30)
Foreign investors * Involved * Ownership -0.093 -1.108 -0.299
(0.14) (0.00) (0.55)
More than one CS * Involved * Ownership 0.019 0.433 0.675
(0.80) (0.31) (0.26)
Sales growth 0.030 0.030 0.103 0.092 0.299 0.283
(0.03) (0.03) (0.17) (0.21) (0.01) (0.01)
Log (age) 0.016 0.018 0.048 0.046 -0.032 -0.035
0.08 (0.06) 0.36 0.37 0.66 0.63
Log (asset) 0.011 0.012 -0.053 -0.049 0.004 0.009
(0.07) (0.06) (0.12) (0.15) (0.93) (0.85)
Debt/asset -0.099 -0.10 -0.649 -0.691 -0.368 -0.416
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.12) (0.08)
Business group -0.006 -0.005 -0.001 -0.005 -0.038 -0.039
(0.70) (0.73) (0.99) (0.96) (0.75) (0.74)
Intercept -0.114 -0.121 2.435 2.371 1.082 1.012
(0.19) (0.16) (0.00) (0.00) (0.11) (0.13)
Adjusted R2 0.134 0.134 0.433 0.442 0.118 0.125
F-statistic 2.260 2.260 7.230 7.460 2.090 2.160
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.001 0.001
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  Business: Property development   
  Market Capitalization: B41,000 Mil. 
  Year founded: 1958 





Figure 2: Metro System Corporation 
                       
                    c o n t r o l                                 c o n t r o l  
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Metro System Corporation 










  Business: Electrical products and computer 
  Market Capitalization: B486 Mil. 
  Year founded: 1986 
 Founder:  Laohathai  family 
         Setpornpong  Family 
         Tangtrongsak  Family  
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Malee Sampran Factory 
Bunmalee Food Processing 
36.02% 






  Business: Food and beverages 
  Market Capitalization: B537.5 Mil. 
  Year founded: 1978 
 Founder:  Kulapiyawaja family  
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       Wacoal Corp. 
          ( J a p a n )     
          3 3 . 6 2 %                                                                                                                                        
International Cosmetics 




Holding companies of 
Sahapat group 
20.08% 
Saha Pathana Inter Holding (PLC) 
20.1% 
Chokwatana  Family     
0.96% 
  Business: Commerce 
  Market Capitalization: B3,400 Mil. 
  Year founded: 1964 
  Founder: Chokwatana family 